Making 2015 a “Year to Remember” at the WTO?

At the last General Council meeting of the year in December, the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s Director General reminded ambassadors that the institution had many deliverables to achieve in 2015.  Roberto Azevedo said, “We have important work to do and real deadlines to meet.  So let’s make sure it’s a year to remember.”

With six months remaining, it is a good time to take stock of how far the WTO has come in meeting its own objectives for 2015.  Although miracles can happen, it is already looking increasingly likely that the multilateral trading system will stumble badly on its way to the finish line this year. 

One deadline to be met was the ratification of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) signed with such fanfare in Bali, Indonesia, in December 2013.  Originally, countries agreed on a deadline of July 31, 2015. 

But members recognized the difficulties in meeting this objective and moved the goalposts even before Azevedo gave his speech in December.  In fact, WTO members ensured that they would never miss the deadline for TFA ratification by removing the finish line entirely.   Now there is no date by which members must submit necessary paperwork to proceed with implementation.

This may have been a good way to deal with a deeply troubling situation.  For the agreement to come into force, 2/3 of the WTO membership must agree.  However, as the original deadline approaches, only 8 countries (Hong Kong, Singapore, United States, Mauritius, Malaysia, Japan, Australia and Botswana) of the necessary 108 have actually submitted their paperwork. 

But now the WTO remains on track for ratification of TFA—whenever sufficient members opt to participate, the agreement will move forward.  No more irritating deadlines to meet or miss.

A second deadline is looming for the organization at the end of this month.  By the end of July, a work plan is due.  This plan is meant to lay out the path forward for the institution to address elements of the Doha Agenda.  It will not get done on time.

This is, quite frankly, almost hard to write.  Members are going to miss a deadline to create a work plan to discuss a path forward on an agenda that was first proposed more than 15 years ago and was formally launched in 2001. 

Officials began discussions again on this workplan more than six months ago.  The comments of Ambassador John Adank are instructive.  At the beginning of the process, he said, “I think that for those who had forgotten the issues, and the positions of each other on those issues, that the meeting served a useful purpose, at least to bring us back to where we were, although I don’t think it’s really given us a clear indication of where we will go—that will need significant change from where we are now.”

Some members are likely to argue that the workplan deadline is quite fungible.  In the past, the WTO routinely missed its own targets for completing workplans and agendas needed for big meetings or ministerials.  Officials will likely argue now that they can keep adjusting the workplan “deadline” until right up to late November for the upcoming ministerial in December.

But anyone who works in a large company will recognize the problems with this argument—big meetings with staff flying in from around the world usually require more than just an agenda.  For a meaningful outcome, everyone needs to start early on preparing background materials, figuring out the context for discussions, matching up likely outcomes with their specific regional needs and requirements, identifying gaps that must be addressed, and so forth. 

The groundwork must also be laid for compromises and for agreements across the myriad groups with issues of concern.   This takes time and, in spite of more than a decade now spent on negotiations, if the agenda is going to be significantly revised, reaching consensus on a new or altered set of outcomes will need more than a few days or weeks.

Another “deadline” of sorts that will be missed are the revisions of the Information Technology Agreement (ITA2).  Unlike most WTO commitments, the ITA applies to only a subset of members.  The original ITA entered into force in 1997.  It lowered tariffs on listed technologies and telecommunications products. 

But this agreement also contained a fatal flaw.  The list of covered products was fixed and has not been changed in the years since it was first negotiated.  Particularly given the rapid pace of change in IT, a frozen list means that record players are included but not new items like mobile phones. 

Repeated attempts to negotiate an ITA2 have foundered.  Officials thought they had reached an acceptable compromise late last year when the United States and China finally worked out their differences.  However, the deal jammed again when South Korea, Taiwan and China were unable to agree on coverage for flat screen panels. 

Despite hopes that ITA2 would be finally completed in early 2015, no breakthrough has been announced.

Any institution with more than 160 members and a widely diverse membership will struggle to meet its objectives.  But the pattern of missed deadlines should be of increasing concern. 

One deadline that cannot be missed is the commitment to hold a ministerial in Nairobi, in December 2015.   The absence of a workplan to guide negotiations and a series of missed deadlines do not inspire confidence in a successful outcome.  

Let us hope that ministers do not gather in Kenya and pledge to make “2016 a year to remember.”

***Talking Trade is a blog post written by Deborah Elms, Executive Director, Asian Trade Centre, Singapore***

China’s Unfolding FTA Strategy

The Chinese currently have 12 free trade agreements (FTAs) in place (listed below).  Many of these agreements are with relatively minor players (with all due respect to countries like Costa Rica, Iceland, Chile and New Zealand).  More recent agreements, between China and Australia and China and South Korea, are more substantial.

The South Korea-China deal was signed on June 1 and will enter into force once parliaments on both sides ratify the agreement.  The Australian agreement was initialed in November 2014 and is also waiting for the completion of domestic procedures to start implementation.

China was hesitant to join the Asian rush to FTAs.  This was, I would argue, partly because it was a late entrant to the World Trade Organization (WTO).  As a newcomer, China's terms of accession to the WTO were quite challenging.  China was required, for example, to drop tariffs on nearly all products entering China. 

Further, it was required to create a legal ceiling on the amount of tariffs it can ever charge that is very low relative to many other developing economies.  This has given China less room for maneuver between the ceiling and the amount of tariffs actually charged at the border (in other words, the difference between bound and applied tariffs is very small).  This is certainly true relative to developing economies that joined the GATT/WTO decades ago. 

China also had to quickly get in place the conditions to protect intellectual property rights at the level required by WTO membership.  This included not just establishing and expanding offices to grant patents, but also training patent examiners and setting up a legal system to enforce IP rights.  

Given the size and importance of China's market, other WTO members watched implementation very carefully.  This is not always the case--many smaller developing countries (especially) have uneven implementation of existing commitments, but since the stakes are often not very high for others, these deviations are not of great concern.  Few legal battles will take place over non-implementation of specific rules with smaller countries over limited markets.  But China is a different story entirely--given its size and growing importance to the global economy, non-implementation is a big deal for other members.  Hence China has faced many challenges in the dispute system at the WTO.

Given this recent history, China was reluctant to take on board any additional trade commitments in an FTA. 

However, as more of the global economy is increasingly connected through FTAs, a stance of staying outside these bilateral and regional arrangements became harder to defend.  Even for China, the competitive disadvantage of not getting benefits available to FTA partners in some markets started to look significant.  

Thus, the Chinese government started negotiations with more significant trading partners, like South Korea.  Sixteen percent of Korea's imports were from China and South Korea exported nearly a quarter of their total exports to China.  This meant that a bilateral deal could be a useful foray into this world of more significant trade arrangements.

The headline figures on the China-Korea FTA sound relatively impressive.  For example, the deal contains 17 chapters.  It covers e-commerce (where China and Korea are both extremely strong) and includes some commitments on government procurement.  It lets production out of Kaesong count as covered South Korean products.

The deal promises tariff reductions on 91% of goods trade.  This is not too bad at all.  Except for the details.  It takes 10 years before China will reach tariff reductions on 71% of goods trade.  Once the deal comes into force, it will be a decade before South Korea is supposed to cover 79% of goods trade.  The agreement gives both sides 20 years to reach full implementation of tariff cuts.

Even then, this is actually less impressive than it appears.  It turns out that China and Korea trade quite a bit with one another, but only in very few sectors like autos and auto parts or certain types of agricultural products.  The Chinese import 852 tariff lines worth of products from Korea and Korea, in turn, imports just 637 tariff lines of items from China.  Even after 20 years, it is very likely (and hard to confirm in the absence of the actual text) that many of these tariff lines will be in the 9% of trade excluded from the agreement.

The Australians appear to have received a more ambitious set of outcomes for their key sectors.  For example, important agricultural markets like dairy, beef, sheep, horticulture products, and many processed foods are to be opened with the removal or reduction of tariffs over periods as relatively short as 4 years.  For many manufactured goods and pharmaceutical products, some of the tariffs are reduced on entry into force.  Some of the services market opening into China is quite helpful, including openings for Australian financial, telecommunications, and construction services. 

The China-Australia FTA also includes a framework for e-commerce, and put into place plans for future negotiations on government procurement. 

Note however, that some of these pledges with both parties could also be revisited in the ongoing Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) talks that include both South Korea and Australia.  The level of commitments in areas like e-commerce could potentially be more significant in this megaregional trade agreement than in the bilateral deals.

If you want to see whether China is serious about opening up its market to greater competition, I think there are two things to watch.  First, are the continuing developments in the Shanghai Free Trade Zone.  This was deliberately set up as a test bed for further liberalization.  But businesses have, generally, been very disappointed with the results.  The restrictions on coverage and small geographical size has meant that companies get relatively few benefits from being in the zone compared with being elsewhere in China (or even in Hong Kong).  Slowly, slowly, the rules around Shanghai are being loosened.  However, if this is intended to be a laboratory, much more will be needed before we can say with confidence that China is prepared to sign on to higher quality, higher standard agreements.

The second development worth watching is the ongoing negotiations with the Americans over the bilateral investment treaty (BIT).  This has lots of potential, as the two sides have agreed to a radical shift in the way China handles inward investment.  Under the BIT, all sectors are meant to be opened for American investment except for those explicitly listed.  The two sides are swapped initial offers in mid-June in Beijing and followed up during the regular US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) meeting later in the month in Washington.  The next exchange of offers is scheduled for September.

Generally when a country switches to using a negative list, the inclination of government officials is to list every sector and subsector as closed to future investment.  Future negotiations consist of a (probably tedious) process of peeling back and pruning the list to a much more manageable set of highly sensitive sectors that will remain closed.  This suggests that the first exchange of offers is likely to look poor.  Indeed, both sides appear to have emerged from the original meetings expressing disappointment.  But what matters is how rapidly and how extensively future negotiations unfold.  

In any case, for China's market to continue to grow, I would argue that it increasingly needs to make changes in domestic rules and regulations and allow greater competition.  For example, as China's firms are investing heavily in research and development and are trying to make the leap from copying things to inventing things, they will increasingly demand protection of these new ideas.  This will, I would suggest, mean that it is in China's interest to ratchet up its own IP protections.  Doing so in the context of a good trade agreement with other benefits might be easier to get done than a unilateral approach. 

Hence, the signs suggest that more ambitious, higher quality agreements around trade are likely to be coming to China in the near term.  This includes offers in ongoing bilateral and regional agreements, such as RCEP. 

China's Free Trade Agreements

·      China-ASEAN FTA

·      China-Pakistan FTA

·      China-Chile FTA

·      China-New Zealand FTA

·      China-Singapore FTA

·      China-Peru FTA

·      Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic and Partnership Arrangement

·      Mainland and Macau Closer Economic and Partnership Arrangement

·      China-Costa Rica FTA

·      China-Iceland FTA

·      China-Switzerland FTA

·      China-Korea FTA

  Free Trade Agreements under Negotiation

·      China-GCC(Gulf Cooperation Council) FTA

·      China-Australia FTA

·      China-Norway FTA

·      China-Japan-Korea FTA

·      Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, RCEP

·      China-ASEAN FTA Upgrade Negotiations

·      China-Sri Lanka FTA

***Talking Trade is a blog post written by Deborah Elms, Executive Director, Asian Trade Centre, Singapore***

Talking Trade Blog Recap

After six months, the Talking Trade blog has attracted a growing list of global readers. We thought this would be a good time to recap the set of materials posted during this time, in case you missed them. We very much appreciate your support and, as always, enjoy receiving feedback from you.



DEFEATED AGAIN: UNDERSTANDING THE AMERICAN CONGRESS VOTES ON TRADE
June 13, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/6/13/defeated-again-understanding-the-american-congress-votes-on-trade


DRAWING UP GUIDELINES FOR BUSINESS IN RCEP
June 8, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/6/8/drawing-up-guidelines-for-business-in-rcep


BATTLE #2: GETTING TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA) THROUGH THE HOUSE
June 3, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/6/3/battle-2-getting-trade-promotion-authority-tpa-through-the-house


THE PACIFIC ALLIANCE TURNS 3
May 28, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/5/28/the-pacific-alliance-turns-3


WHERE DOES TRADE FIT ON CORPORATE ORGANIZATION CHARTS?
May 26, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/5/26/where-does-trade-fit-on-corporate-organization-charts


WHEN BUSINESS SITS AT THE TABLE IN APEC
May 20, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/5/20/when-business-sits-at-the-table-in-apec


THE TPA VOTE: THE DAY AMERICA STOPPED LEADING ON TRADE?
May 13, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/5/13/the-tpa-vote-the-day-america-stopped-leading-on-trade


USING TRADE DEALS FOR NON-MEMBERS
May 7, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/5/7/using-trade-deals-for-non-members



THE OTHER HALF: DEALING WITH U.S.-JAPAN AUTO DISPUTES
May 4, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/5/4/the-other-half-dealing-with-us-japan-auto-disputes



WHY IS AGRICULTURE SO DIFFICULT FOR TRADE DEALS?
April 28, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/4/28/why-is-agriculture-so-difficult-for-trade-deals


DEFENDING THE INDEFENSIBLE IN TPP
April 24, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/4/24/defending-the-indefensible-in-tpp


USING E-COMMERCE TO HELP SMALLER COMPANIES
April 20, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/4/20/using-e-commerce-to-help-smaller-companies


GETTING TPA FOR TPP
April 16, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/4/16/getting-tpa-for-tpp


THE COSTS OF INEFFICIENT ROAD TRANSPORT
April 14, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/4/14/the-costs-of-inefficient-road-transport


RESTORING THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM?
April 10, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/4/10/restoring-the-multilateral-trading-system


LIVING WITH THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP)
April 6, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/4/6/living-with-the-trans-pacific-partnership-tpp


FACILITATING TRADE
April 1, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/4/1/facilitating-trade


LEGACY OF LEE KUAN YEW
March 26, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/3/26/legacy-of-lee-kuan-yew


HOW OREO COULD BECOME BEST FRIENDS WITH THE MARLBORO MAN
March 23, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/3/23/how-oreo-could-become-best-friends-with-the-marlboro-man


AN ODE TO LOBBYISTS
March 19, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/3/19/an-ode-to-lobbyists


ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (AEC): PREPARING FOR DISAPPOINTMENT?
March 16, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/3/16/asean-economic-community-aec-preparing-for-disappointment


TRADE BOTTLENECKS: A REVIEW OF ONE DAY IN THE JAKARTA POST
March 13, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/3/13/trade-bottlenecks-a-review-of-one-day-in-the-jakarta-post


CREATING THE TPP SECRETARIAT
March 9, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/3/9/creating-the-tpp-secretariat


ISDS: A LITTLE BIT OF KNOWLEDGE IS A DANGEROUS THING
March 2, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/3/2/isds-a-little-bit-of-knowledge-is-a-dangerous-thing


THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, OR WHAT HAPPENS WHEN A TREE FALLS AND NO ONE CARES
February 27, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/2/27/the-world-trade-organization-or-what-happens-when-a-tree-falls-and-no-one-cares


BLOCKING TRADE WITH A LABEL
February 24, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/2/24/blocking-trade-with-a-label


TPP: WAITING FOR GODOT?
February 20, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/2/20/tpp-waiting-for-godot


CURRENCY: MANIPULATING AN END TO THE TPP?
February 16, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/2/16/currency-manipulating-an-end-to-the-tpp


RCEP: LOW QUALITY, LOW AMBITION BECKONS?
February 12, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/2/12/rcep-low-quality-low-ambition-beckons


REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP (RCEP): AN ASIAN TRADE
AGREEMENT FOR A VALUE CHAIN WORLD
February 10, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/2/10/regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership-rcep-an-asian-trade-agreement-for-a-value-chain-world


THE TTIP PAPER CONUNDRUM: A4 VERSUS US LETTER
February 4, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/2/4/the-ttip-paper-conundrum-a4-versus-us-letter


UPDATED UPDATE: PORK, BEEF AND AUTOS
February 2, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/2/2/updated-update-pork-beef-and-autos


BEEF, PORK AND BUTTER IN JAPAN: AN UPDATE ON "SACREDS"
January 30, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/1/30/beef-pork-and-butter-in-japan-an-update-on-sacreds


TPP: THE IMPORTANCE OF RESOLVING THE “SACRED” MARKET ACCESS ISSUES
January 27, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/1/27/tpp-the-importance-of-resolving-the-sacred-market-access-issues


MY "STATE OF THE UNION" IS STRONGER ON TRADE
January 22, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/1/22/my-state-of-the-union-is-stronger-on-trade


PROMOTING TRADE: CONGRESS AND THE PASSAGE OF TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA)
January 20, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/1/20/promoting-trade-congress-and-the-passage-of-trade-promotion-authority-tpa


TRANSPARENCY, CONGRESS AND THE TPP
January 14, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/1/14/transparency-congress-and-the-tpp


NEGOTIATING SECRECY
January 12, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/1/12/negotiating-secrecy


UNLEASHING VIETNAM’S TEXTILES
January 8, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/1/8/unleashing-vietnams-textiles


2015: A PROMISING YEAR FOR TRADE
January 6, 2015
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/1/6/2015-a-promising-year-for-trade

Doing the Right Thing When All Else Has Been Tried: Congress Tries TPA Once More

WASHINGTON, DC: This week in Washington, more people than I can count have repeated a quotation attributed to Winston Churchill, “America will do the right thing only when it has tried everything else first.”  We are testing this theory right now on the trade front, as Congress grapples with how to undo the various “procedural snafus” that have bedeviled the votes on Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA).

Yesterday, I wrote two different blog posts and had to toss them out and start over again this morning as events have been moving swiftly on the ground here in Washington. 

After the shock defeat of TPA/TAA in the House of Representatives on Friday, many of the folks in the city that care about trade spent the early part of this week trying to figure out a possible solution. 

Congressional leaders have opted for a risky strategy.  The House just passed a “clean” TPA resolution by 218-208.  This bill splits apart TPA from TAA. 

The hope now is that the Senate will re-vote next week on the new House-approved version of TPA.  Assuming the two bills match, TPA can quickly be passed along to the President for signature.

But this is a risky strategy because it requires Democrats in both parts of Congress to vote for TPA without TAA.  They must count on promises that Trade Adjustment will be up for another vote prior to its expiry in September.  Given the low levels of trust in Washington these days and the growing polarization of both parties, this is an interesting gamble. 

The goal is to complete the entire process prior to the July 4th recess in Congress.

Most likely, the chief negotiators for the TPP have shifted existing plans to meet until just after July 4.  They are likely to need two weeks to complete negotiations.  The ministers are likely to be penciled in for mid-July in the hope that they can sign the completed agreement by then (after some furious late nights of bargaining). 

If this near-death experience has had any upside, it may be that it has concentrated minds.  Partner countries and American negotiators will have to think carefully about any further delays in getting the agreement finished.  I believe that officials will be more ready to wrap this deal up than ever before.

Once the agreement is finished, under TPA rules, officials will have 30 days to finish legal scrubbing and any other associated technical details.  Fortunately, English is the official language of the TPP, which will reduce the amount of time needed for translations and the legal work on each translated version.

The document will then be published for 60 days before the President and other leaders can sign the agreement.  Hence, if all the deadlines line up, it is just barely possible to imagine the TPP finished and signed off in or around the next APEC Leader’s Meeting in Manila in mid-November. 

Given the issues around getting trade agreements through Congress, officials across government will be feverishly working to get any necessary implementing legislation worked out during the TPA review window period.  This ought to allow a Congressional vote on the TPP—just barely—by the end of this year.  

Hence, the TPP can still be completed in 2015.  (But note that entry into force will still be some distance away, likely in 2017, as countries will require some time to bring domestic rules and regulations into compliance with TPP rules.)

But what if the agreement is not done this year?  I have heard two opposite and distinct arguments about 2017.

First, lots of people here have suggested that approval of TPP should just be postponed until after the next president is in office in January 2017.

I believe this is deeply problematic. For starters, the lineup of participating countries in the TPP could be radically different by January 2017.  Canada faces a tough election in October.  The Prime Minister of Australia has already narrowly survived one no confidence vote from his Parliament.  The Prime Minister of Malaysia is struggling to maintain his office in the wake of a growing scandal over government funds as well as a softening economy. 

The Prime Minister of Japan has staked his entire reputation and government policy around radical shifts in the economic space.  If TPP does not succeed, he might well not survive either.   It is highly unlikely that any successor will be inclined to take the politically difficult steps needed to bring TPP into force in Japan.

The list could go on—Brunei might implement sharia law in a way that is deeply problematic.  Malaysia could find additional mass graves.  Between now and 19 months from now, all manner of issues could easily derail any agreement and any TPP government.

The assumption by many here seems to be that whoever wins office in Washington at the end of next year will be more enthusiastic about trade and the TPP and will be more able or willing to cajole, arm twist, charm, threaten opponents or reward supporters than the current occupant of the White House.  And that the next Congress will be equally keen to take on a big, fraught policy decision right after being seated in the Capitol building.  Even if the rest of the world somehow stood still, the picture in Washington is unlikely to be so rosy.

Deciding now to wait until 2017 to get the TPP approved is a poor idea.  Wishful thinking is not going to solve the problems of getting a high stakes trade agreement past 535 members of Congress and into the hands of the President for signature.

But this does conflict with a second argument I have heard in Washington regarding timing.  If the agreement cannot be ratified by late 2015 or very early in 2016 given the presidential election dynamics, the world will not end if domestic approval inside the U.S. slips slightly. 

We have precedent for this as the free trade agreements with Columbia, Panama and South Korea all sat for years waiting to be approved in Washington.  All three countries even had to go back to the negotiating table. 

It should not be a surprise that I am not at all in favor of this idea.  Most of the TPP member countries have put a great deal on the line domestically to get this far.  After more than 5 years of negotiations, any further delay can be quite problematic.  Businesses are already waiting for implementation and have started making investments and shifting production to account for TPP rules. 

The best strategy—by far—is to approve TPA by the end of next week.  TPA really ought to have been relatively uncontroversial, although past votes on the topic have also been fraught with challenges.  In any case, once TPA is finished, officials can quickly wrap up the TPP and prepare for the final battle over this agreement.  Hopefully, voting on TPP will be less nail-biting than the votes over TPA.

***Talking Trade is a blog written by Deborah Elms, Executive Director, Asian Trade Centre, Singapore***

Defeated Again: Understanding The American Congress Votes on Trade

When the U.S. Senate first rejected the bills on Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), I wrote that it may have marked the day the Americans quit leading on trade.  Although the Senate subsequently managed to squeak through the necessary authorizations, the votes from the House of Representatives today suggests I was right.  Getting the United States to show leadership on trade is somewhere between a tough and an impossible task.

To recap where we are: although the United States has been negotiating multiple trade agreements for years, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR or basically the trade minister) does not formally have trade authority as delegated from Congress.  Under what used to be called fast track and is now known as Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), Congress lets the White House lead on trade.  Congress sets up the parameters for negotiations and expedited procedures for final approvals. 

USTR went ahead with talks in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Promotion (TTIP) “as if” the provisions of TPA were in effect.  The White House had opted not to try for renewal sooner (the last version expired in 2007) because they were not convinced that Congress would view the request favorably in the absence of information about what sorts of agreements were under negotiation.  Therefore, the executive branch decided to negotiate first and seek permission at a later date, when it would be more clear to the legislative branch what sorts of benefits and costs might be on offer.

With the TPP waiting for TPA to close the agreement, it was no longer possible to pretend that authorization was in place.  The other TPP member countries have refused to discuss the most sensitive aspects of the negotiation in the absence of clear authority from Congress to pass the final deal without amendment.

Hence the push to get TPA, starting with the Senate.  The original bill was defeated, only to be resurrected days later. 

The Senate votes set up the challenge for the House now.  If the House version of TPA does not exactly match the Senate’s bill, members from both sides would have to sit down and reconcile the inconsistencies.  The final, combined, bill would have to be voted on again by both bodies.

Given the difficulties in getting TPA, no one wants a situation where members of Congress are forced to vote twice.  Hence, the House version had to match the Senate version exactly.

Which leads us, depressingly, to today’s House votes.  The Senate bill had done two things—it renewed authorization of Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) and granted TPA.  (An earlier post discussed TAA in more detail.)

The House was reluctant to vote on a similar combined bill.  Thus, they split the bill into two halves—first a vote on TAA and then a vote on TPA. 

The TAA bill went down to defeat.  Even Democratic members of the House that are in favor of the idea of assistance for displaced workers voted against TAA renewal.  This bill, many argued, was insufficient for one reason or another.  Republicans that are not fans of TAA at all had to step up and try to push it over the finish line.  But it was not enough as 86 Republican and 40 Democrat yes votes lost to 303 no votes.

Once TAA was defeated, it also spelled the end to TPA.  This is because the House and Senate versions of the bill have to match.  The Senate authorized both TAA and TPA.  Therefore, the House must also have matching legislation in place. 

In a grim attempt to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat, House members then proceeded to vote—narrowly—in favor of TPA (219-212).  This looked, to people not familiar with the intricacies of Congress, like a success.

But it is not.  Hence, for the second time in weeks, Congress refused to show leadership on trade. 

What comes next is unclear.  It is possible that the House will figure out a solution to what is again being called a “procedural snafu.”  Maybe sufficient members on both sides of the aisle will reconsider their votes on TAA.  Perhaps the Senate will revote on TPA without TAA or with a different version of TAA that might be acceptable to the House. 

Even if this can be fixed, it means that the TPP may not close as planned.  Chief negotiators were expecting to meet on June 22.  This—at best—now looks optimistic.  The deadlines have always been perilously short. 

Once the immediate crisis is resolved one way or another, it is certainly worth thinking hard about why Congress has twice voted against trade.  (And against the President in spite of a full-court press the likes of which Washington has rarely seen in recent memory.) 

I am on my way to Washington DC and will write another blog post once I’ve had the chance to discuss issues with trade and business experts from the ground.  Perhaps only inside-the-Beltway naval gazers can make sense of what has been happening.  Because much of Asia (at least) has been watching in amazement as American legislators reject what most in this region see as common sense.  Cutting off your nose to spite your face does not seem a sensible policy.

***Talking Trade is a blog post written by Deborah Elms, Executive Director, Asian Trade Centre, Singapore***