Multilateral Trade at a Crossroads: 20 Years of the WTO

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is gearing up for a major ministerial meeting to take place in Nairobi, Kenya, at the end of this year.  The meeting will coincide with the 20th anniversary of the WTO. 

This ought to have been the occasion for a happy party and celebration.  It is not.  Officials are struggling to deliver even the tiniest package of positive outcomes and concrete results. 

This is a depressing outcome for an institution starting its third decade.  It matters too, particularly for the smallest, poorest and most vulnerable economies. 

Normally, for a ministerial meeting just six weeks away, members would have already agreed on the basic texts of the final declaration.  All outcomes would be mostly lined up and ready to go.  After all, the WTO is a bit like an ocean liner.  It takes time and considerable effort to get more than 160 member countries to agree on declarations and outcomes, even if the greatest will in the world exists to get these things done.

Unfortunately, political will is in terribly short supply in Geneva, as shown by the meager harvest of possible outcomes for Nairobi:

1.  Negotiations on the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) are at a complete standstill.  These global trade talks, launched in 2001, are supposed to address (at least) agricultural and services trade and help modernize the rulebook for the WTO. 

No one can say so publically, but these talks are dead.  The various partial “deals” that were on the table in the past are simply not going to be the basis for future negotiations.  Key players have moved on and will not accept a return to the past in 2016 and beyond.  Since the WTO is a consensus-based institution, the unwillingness of many to engage in an old agenda or use old frameworks for addressing issues effectively means the DDA is finished.

Where the institution goes from here is a good question.  Unfortunately, discussion of future pathways cannot begin in earnest until the existing approaches are firmly put to the side.  The topics may remain, but the mechanisms for achieving outcomes will have to change.

2.  With the main product stuck, officials are scrambling to cobble together anything positive.  Still on the table as a possible deliverable for Nairobi: a commitment to rule out export subsidies (or, put more crudely, to do anything related to agriculture).  The basic issue with reducing subsidies explicitly for the purpose of export is that almost no country provides such subsidies any longer.  It could be worthwhile to discuss export rules and restrictions, but an export subsidies commitment is going to have minimal implications for the global trade system.

3.  Promises on transparency.  There are lots of things that might usefully be done to increase transparency at the WTO, including full implementation of previous pledges to immediately provide information on new bilateral and regional trade agreements (FTAs).  However, whatever happens on transparency in areas like antidumping actions or fish subsidies or FTA notification requires willingness by members to actually be transparent and timely.  So far, the track record of members to abide by WTO transparency rules is not good—no matter what may happen in Nairobi.

4.  Measures to help Least Developed Countries (LDC)s.  Even here, members continue to disagree on what sort of promises might be usefully made to improve the prospects for LDC members in the WTO.  For example, negotiations on a services waiver have been difficult.  Granting duty-free, quota-free access remains controversial. A new dispute has erupted over extending a waiver on pharmaceutical patents for public health in LDC countries.

5.  In the absence of DDA progress, some WTO members would like to announce progress on other issues.  First up, the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA).  This agreement was signed with great fanfare at the last ministerial meeting in Bali in December 2013.  Unfortunately, movement towards implementation has been extremely slow. 

The 52nd country (Pakistan) stepped forward with its implementation commitments on October 27.  This sounds impressive, but do recall that the number is skewed upwards by 28 members of the EU who all accepted at once.  Two-thirds of total WTO members must agree to participate before the deal can start moving.  Getting substantial new members to sign on will be challenging with the limited time remaining before Nairobi.  Two years have already passed.

6.  Members want to announce movement on the Information Technology Agreement II (ITA2).  This is a plurilateral (meaning not all WTO members are involved in the negotiations) agreement designed to extend an existing plurilateral commitment on tariff-free coverage for technology goods.  While members did agree on a list of 201 products for inclusion on the list, they remain quite divided on the timing of tariff reductions.  Hence, the deal is really only partially finished.

7.  The Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) has also received some positive coverage by the WTO.  This is another plurilateral agreement designed to make it easier for countries to trade in environmentally-friendly goods by lowering tariffs on specified products like wind turbines. 

Looking at the progress of these negotiations closely, however, not much of note can likely be announced at Nairobi.  Of the 665 products on the provisional list at the beginning of this month, member states disagreed about the placement of nearly 200, or almost 1/3, of the total number of items under consideration.   

8.  Another important plurilateral negotiation, Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), is also not yet ready for unveiling in Kenya.  Negotiations are progressing, but too slowly to achieve results in a few weeks.

Even changes to the Secretariat that might be helpful in updating the institution are proving problematic.  For example, while the dispute settlement system is often described as the “crown jewel” of the WTO system, growing backlogs are tarnishing the crown.  Discussions of how to alleviate a staff shortage and adjust the system have been mostly languishing since 2013.

My own modest proposal to revamp the WTO’s website and extend outreach to new stakeholders with a better use of social media outlets was coolly received at a meeting in Singapore last week of Asian trade officials and Secretariat staff.  Such changes, it was suggested, could require buy-in from members and may also prove impossible given resource constraints. 

I would argue that an institution that cannot fix its own outdated website without encountering pushback and internal disagreement is not well-positioned to handle many of the toughest trade issues as it heads into a third decade of existence.

***Just in—Indonesia’s President Jokowi apparently told President Obama that Indonesia “will join” the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).  The New York Times did not provide a timeline for this “eventual” commitment.  Bets anyone?

***Talking Trade is a blog post written by Dr. Deborah Elms, Executive Director, Asian Trade Centre, Singapore***

Traveling with One “L” or Two? A Review of TPP Timelines

A former trade negotiator once told me that he spent over an hour of his time on Earth arguing over whether or not the word “traveling” should be spelled with one “L” (American style) or two (British style).  Such linguistic disputes are common in the final phases of trade agreements, as the legal texts get nailed down and then translated.

For the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the legal teams are holed up in Japan, confirming all the final details of the agreement.  In both legal and trade terms, language is extremely important.  There is a vast difference between a sentence that reads, “Members shall…” and “Members shall endeavor…”  The former requires the action by members while the latter merely urges action. 

Getting a dozen legal teams to comb out the final details on such a comprehensive agreement that runs to hundreds of pages is taking a long time.  Fortunately, the official language of the TPP is English.  This means that, although the final document will also be translated into Spanish and French, the legally applicable text is the English version only.  This dramatically cuts down on the time required between the completion of negotiations and possible release of final texts. 

While we all wait for the texts and associated schedules to be circulated (hopefully within another week or two), it seems a good time to review the timelines ahead for the TPP. 

In general, there are two critical sets of timelines that matter for the agreement.  The first deadlines are a whole set of complicated dates related to approval of the TPP inside the United States.  The second deadlines are those related to entry into force for the entire TPP agreement. 

To make matters more complicated, the US domestic procedures contain multiple timelines.  To try to summarize (and simplify slightly) the situation:

1.     President Obama, following Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) guidelines, has to notify Congress of his intention to sign the texts.  This triggers a 90 day procedure under which the texts must be formally released to the public for at least 60 days.  At the end of 90 days, the President is allowed to sign the agreement.

2.     The formal signature of the agreement by the President must be accompanied (within 60 days) with a list of legislative changes necessary for Congress to consider in order to bring domestic laws into compliance with TPP rules (wherever needed). 

3.     At some point, the President will need to deliver to Congress the official text of the agreement, a draft implementing bill, and a statement about how the agreement matches requirements of Congress under TPA.

4.     Once Congress receives the bill from the President, it must send the bill directly to relevant committees for expedited review.  There are specific time deadlines that apply again once the bill has been submitted.

5.     After limited floor debate, both houses of Congress must vote on the bill.  No amendments are allowed, so members must vote either yes or no.

Hence, one important issue inside Washington is figuring out when is the most auspicious moment to trigger some of the deadlines.  Most critical, of course, is the best opportunity for the final debates and reviews inside of Congress prior to final votes.

While many will feel particular urgency to get US approval for the TPP agreement, the implementation of TPP commitments across all 12 members remains some distance off.  New Zealand’s government has been releasing a series of helpful fact sheets.  One, on implementation and legal commitments, highlights the three options included in the TPP agreement for handling the entry into force deadlines.

The basic problem is that, while negotiations on the TPP agreement with the 12 members concluded on October 5, member states need to have domestic approval to move forward with implementation.  An agreement with a dozen participants may run into difficulties at the domestic level in getting approvals at the same time. 

Hence, the TPP has three possible methods for achieving entry into force.  The first and easiest method is to have all 12 countries finish domestic procedures within 2 years of signing the agreement.   Within 60 days of the last approval, the agreement automatically enters into force. 

Under option 1, entry into force could be much sooner than 2 years since it is triggered by the speed of domestic procedures alone.  Most TPP members have parliamentary systems, where the government usually has higher confidence that domestic legislators will follow government policy.  It is conceivable that many TPP members could put the matter before parliaments immediately after signature and be ready to move forward in a matter of weeks.

Except, as noted, the United States.  To add to the difficulties, as anyone following the United States knows, America is in the middle of a drawn-out electoral cycle in a bitterly contested, hyper-partisan environment.  It is not at all clear whether the TPP will get the 51% of votes needed in both houses of Congress or when this approval might be most likely.

This concern has given rise to the next option for TPP approval.  Under option 2, if all 12 parties have been unable to commit to the agreement at the domestic level inside of 2 years, the agreement can still come into force if at least 6 members are ready. 

However, this comes with a catch—because TPP officials have been worried that either the United States or Japan would not get the agreement through their legislators and bureaucracies for approval, option 2 also requires that both countries must be among the six (or more) countries ready to move ahead to implementation.   Hence, option 2 really means that, provided the United States and Japan can join up with at least 4 other good-sized members by the end of a two-year period, the agreement can proceed.

But what if either Japan or the United States are not finished with domestic procedures within 2 years?  Then Option 3 kicks in, under which the agreement can come into force within 60 days of the last one signing the agreement (along with the other major party and at least 4 more members). 

The TPP agreement, therefore, does give more weight to the Japanese and American approvals than the remainder.  This is a reflection of economic realities, where the payoffs are greatest if, and only if, the biggest markets are included.  Unless all 12 members are included at the outset, then members that collectively contribute at least 85% of the market size need to be ready to implement the TPP.  Any country that is not involved at the date of entry into force (other than the U.S. and Japan) can enter the agreement at any later time.

This complex set of entry into force conditions makes it difficult to predict with accuracy exactly how soon the TPP will take effect.  If all 12 parties moved at light speed, the soonest possible date could be fall 2016.  It is a pretty safe bet, however, that this will not happen so smoothly or so soon.  Instead, businesses might realistically be planning and pushing for TPP implementation in 2017.

***Talking Trade is a blog post written by Dr. Deborah Elms, Executive Director, Asian Trade Centre, Singapore***

Creating Conditions for E-Commerce to Flourish in Asia Through RCEP

BUSAN—The 10th round of negotiations in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) are finishing up in Busan, South Korea, this week.  Sixteen Asian economies are taking part (Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam).

One of the more innovative areas under discussion in RCEP has been the launch of negotiations in e-commerce.  These discussions have the potential to create new rules and regulations governing an increasingly vital portion of 21st century trade in the region.

Our overall proposal for e-commerce negotiations within RCEP is broad, encompassing specific rules for goods, services and payments, as well as including necessary background conditions for e-commerce to flourish.  Without careful consideration of the rapidly evolving environment for e-commerce and digital trade, RCEP officials might slow the spread of new channels of delivery for goods and services and undermine growth opportunities for many small and large firms.

Officials must think carefully about the range of e-commerce activities.  The sector provides more opportunities than simply buying a book online and having it delivered to a customer’s home.  Firms can be buying and selling both goods and services to one another (B2B), to consumers (B2C) and even from consumers to other consumers (C2C). 

The Asian Trade Centre held a stakeholder outreach session in Busan on October 14, followed by a discussion session on e-commerce.  The setting of the workshop in Korea was important.  Korean companies are at the forefront of delivering many new digital trade services and consumers here are extremely savvy customers of a wide range of e-commerce options.  The subway trains, for instance, are full of young and not-so-young people consuming digital services.

These digital services cannot provide information if necessary frameworks are not put into place.  For example, without ease of movement for information across borders, many firms will struggle to reach outside markets where many valuable commercial opportunities can be found.

In the past, firms that wanted to export goods and services had to invest significant resources.  With the advent of the internet and digital trade, however, even the smallest companies in the most far-flung locations can find customers and plug into regional and global markets.  Connecting to these new business opportunities and expanding the customer base can happen relatively easily and inexpensively.

Asia is at the forefront in many ways of the coming e-commerce and digital revolutions.  Asian companies are increasingly becoming global powerhouses in various settings.  More consumers are online or connected via mobile than nearly anywhere else in the world.

Much of this growth has taken place in a largely unregulated environment.  Governments have not yet created a thicket of rules, licenses and procedures to govern e-commerce trade in the region in similar ways to their approach to off-line trade and commerce.  However, as e-commerce continues to boom and as more goods and services are migrating to digital platforms, the incentives for Asian governments to try to create policy are growing.

Creating smart policies can be challenging, in part because e-commerce sits at the intersection of multiple areas and falls between jurisdictions of ministries.  For trade negotiators, as an example, effective e-commerce rules are likely to require sensible policies in intellectual property rights.  Tight protection and enforcement of copyright can get complicated very quickly in the digital world.  At a time, for example, when hundreds of hours of content and videos are uploaded every minute of every day, policing all this information is going to be difficult or impossible to do effectively.

It is therefore necessary for officials in RCEP to consider e-commerce and portions of the intellectual property rights chapter in conjunction.  The areas of particular interest from the perspective of digital trade, besides careful consideration of copyright rules, include rules to determine who is responsible (or not) for particular types of content, and what levels of protection are appropriate. 

What makes this especially tricky for officials is that determining appropriate policy measures may create new, distorting effects on markets.  For example, a determination that one set of measures is acceptable for solving a specific problem—such as requiring that information and data can only be held or stored domestically—could rapidly lead to unintended consequences.  Firms might find that local providers of data storage are less careful with information or companies may face significantly higher prices.  Policies designed to determine which types of information must remain onshore are also likely to prove problematic in practice. 

In rapidly shifting markets with evolving technology, whatever specific solution or technology officials promote may ultimately turn out badly.  This is not to suggest that regulations are never a good idea.  Rather, officials should be encouraged to think about the end-goals and legitimate policy objectives that they want companies to meet.

Company experiences can highlight the shifts in market opportunities created by new regulatory frameworks.  For example, changes in payment systems have allowed many firms to flourish in foreign markets and build up their brands with new buyers.  New regulatory environments can encourage direct purchasing from online vendors of all stripes.  Poor policy choices can stifle growth and development, leaving smaller firms unable to compete. Speed to market and lower costs are critical to the success of small companies. 

As RCEP officials wrap up their sessions in Busan, it is important to consider cross-cutting policies for e-commerce and digital trade that connect across and between multiple chapters.  Taking a holistic view of the changing nature of trade will help ensure that RCEP is and remains relevant in the future.  Greater engagement with e-commerce and digital companies is also needed to help officials craft the best types of policy outcomes to meet business and consumer needs in this dynamic environment.

***Talking Trade is a blog post written by Dr. Deborah Elms, Executive Director, Asian Trade Centre, Singapore***

Pop Open the Sparkling Wine! The Conclusion of the TPP Negotiations

The deal is done.  Negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement that started in Australia in March 2010 have finally been brought to conclusion.  The 12 negotiating parties of the TPP (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United States and Vietnam) managed at last to lock together nearly 30 chapters covering a wide array of topics.

The TPP is a different kind of trade agreement from the myriad other free trade deals because:

·      It is broader.  The TPP covers 29 chapters including typical topics like goods, services, and investment provisions.  It also includes new rules on intellectual property rights, opens up government procurement markets, creates common understandings for e-commerce trade, and includes some new regulations for food, food safety and other types of technical standards. 

·      It is deeper.  Past free trade agreements (FTAs) between members may have opened up trade in goods.  But the TPP is likely to reduce barriers to trade further.  This includes opening up highly sensitive agricultural markets that are traditionally carved out, or excluded entirely from FTAs.  Even in areas where coverage is incomplete and duties do not drop to zero, products are included that are normally not discussed or where existing FTA reductions can be extremely modest (like rice, dairy, and sugar). 

·      It includes shared norms and commitments for all members.  Unlike other agreements, the TPP rules apply equally to everyone.  The least developed country members have longer time frames to implement some of the commitments, but the same basic rules will apply.  Members opted to join the TPP and, by doing so, signaled their own internal commitment to implementing high quality pledges in every aspect of the agreement.

Is this agreement perfect?  Of course not.  If we put a dozen people in a room, each would likely have their own definition of perfection.  The TPP negotiators never defined what they meant by their own mantra of “21st century, high quality” either.  But the deal on the table is likely to be the very best agreement that could be achieved given the constellation of members, interests and topics. 

Much will be written in the coming days about the gaps between the outcome and the aspirational goals.  It is likely that various groups will target specific sections for criticism.  Some groups that have been complaining loudly will continue to do so no matter what sort of outcome was achieved. 

At the end, however, the deal had to satisfy domestic constituents in 12 countries in nearly 30 different topics.  Getting it done necessarily required some compromises from everyone.  Importantly, this agreement was not simply a deal cut between the United States and Japan (their bilateral portion covered 6 agricultural items and autos only). 

The TPP was genuinely crafted by members from all participating countries and the final outcome reflects many hard-fought compromises. 

To examine just one challenging aspect of the TPP, consider the market for beef.  Beef is often viewed as a sensitive topic in many of the TPP member countries.  Government policies have long favored beef producers.  These policies have included tariff barriers that have been resistant to change despite repeated rounds of negotiations in the multilateral setting as well as in various bilateral agreements. 

The TPP does not drop tariffs in beef to 0 in all member countries.  Nor does it drop tariffs this low even at the end of full implementation.  Yet the TPP result remains an improvement (and even a potentially dramatic improvement) off the status quo.  The TPP provides new benefits for beef exporters--even in markets with existing FTAs. 

Something similar is likely in nearly every area under negotiation.  For market access in goods across the board, the TPP drops tariffs to 0 on entry into force for 90% of tariff lines.  Over a relatively short timeline, most of the remaining tariffs will also drop to 0. 

Compare this to the alternatives.  As I have explained in the past, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in Asia is meant to start with less than half of all tariff lines included for some members and—at the end of full implementation at some likely very distant time horizon—tariff coverage may top out at 80% of lines.  This means that 20% of goods are not going to receive any tariff cut benefits at all.  Beef is one sector that is highly likely to remain out of RCEP commitments (certainly absent significant industry involvement to promote improved outcomes).

For more complex products, the TPP greatly simplifies business on the ground.  Currently, companies trading between TPP member states may have access to some existing preferences from FTAs.  However, the cumulation of rules of origin in the TPP means that companies can aggregate inputs from all TPP countries to count towards the origin of more complex goods.  The ability to “count” more under TPP content makes it much easier to import and export goods (mostly duty free) between member countries.

There are also a host of other benefits to speed up and reduce costs associated with moving goods, including new commitments on trade facilitation and changes in customs procedures. 

The TPP, of course, goes well beyond trade in goods.  For the creation of today’s modern supply chains, the TPP includes meaningful openings in services markets of all types.  Most manufactured goods include substantial inputs of services—some are delivered directly by the firms while others are outsourced.  Many of these outsourced services are now opened to large and small TPP member firms.  The TPP expands access and protection for investments of various types. 

For more information on what the TPP means for business, please check out our latest publication, available for download on our website.  As the texts become available, we will update our information.  Future blog posts will also examine some more of the specific commitments of the agreement in greater detail.

If you or your company would like to discuss possible benefits that arise from the TPP, please do not hesitate to contact us.  We are very much looking forward to moving into the ratification and implementation phases for the TPP.

***Talking Trade is a blog post written by Dr. Deborah Elms, Executive Director, Asian Trade Centre, Singapore***

Why Business Needs to Remain Involved in Trade Agreements

While we wait for the possible closure of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations next week (fingers crossed!), it is worth pondering why businesses must be engaged as much as possible in the process of negotiations.  Without business input and pressure, officials are likely to create a final agreement that does not suit the needs of companies on the ground.

Completing an agreement is only half the battle.  Once the texts are finished, participating countries must take steps to implement their commitments.  Without business pressure, implementation measures are often half-hearted or even non-existent. 

We can see these problems in different settings across Asia.  Take, for example, trade facilitation efforts.  Asian governments have made promises to speed up and reduce costs associated with moving goods across borders in this region. 

The trade facilitation agreement (TFA) signed with great fanfare in Bali, Indonesia, in December 2013, is still awaiting ratification and implementation.  This is a signature achievement of the World Trade Organization (WTO) after more than a decade of negotiations. 

On September 18, Liechtenstein became the 17th country to have taken official steps to move the agreement towards implementation.  The agreement requires 2/3 of the WTO membership before the deal actually enters into force.  This means that more than 140 additional countries must agree to participate—preferably before the end of this year—before any of the provisions in the agreement can be activated.

While this agreement may bring substantial benefits for businesses, especially in many developing countries where getting goods across borders remains slow and expensive, businesses have not been particularly active in pushing TFA. 

In general, businesses long ago lost interest in most of the agenda under discussion at the WTO.  This is not, I will hasten to add, necessarily because the agenda itself is unimportant.  Mostly, I think, it’s because companies do not have the same type of time horizons that the WTO seems to operate on these days.  No firm can afford to spend a decade pushing topics without any clear returns from this investment.

But the net result is a bit of a chicken-and-egg dilemma.  Governments are not going to rush to negotiate or implement an agreement like TFA absent business interest.  However, businesses are loath to push on TFA without clear signs that the payoff will arrive shortly.  There is frankly little upside to convincing corporate bosses that your efforts helped Liechtenstein sign an agreement.

Another problematic area of trade facilitation can be found in ASEAN.  Although the 10 members of ASEAN made a commitment in 2005 to create by 2012 what are called National Single Windows (NSWs) for trade, not all members have actually implemented these provisions.  NSWs are intended to make it easier for firms to move goods by allowing the entry of data only once and the simultaneous processing of that information by all the relevant agencies so that arriving goods can clear customs speedily. (Note that NSWs are only the first step, as ASEAN also pledged to hook them together and create an ASEAN-wide Single Window.)

Despite significant efforts and the involvement of the ASEAN Secretariat and various ASEAN Dialogue Partners like the United States, Vietnam’s launch of its own NSW earlier this month meant that only 7 of 10 members officially have active systems.   Even here, the record from the ground is less impressive, as many businesses report obstacles to using NSWs.

Again, part of the problem has been getting significant business pressure mobilized to ensure that ASEAN governments implement commitments in a timely manner.  Businesses that have been active in this issue could be feeling burned by the extensive time it has taken for their efforts to bear fruit in the form of faster and easier trade facilitation in ASEAN.

Ironically, however, trade facilitation ought to be one of the easier topics for mobilizing business engagement with trade officials.  After all, delays at the border are obvious and costly.  It is relatively easy for a firm to show the impact of reducing barriers to their own supplies and goods at customs. 

Other elements of the trade agenda can be much harder for businesses to push.  For example, while it may be true that opening up services sectors will result in substantial benefits, even for manufacturing companies, it is harder to show clearly the bottom line impact of doing so.  Hence, getting firms to mobilize behind broader trade negotiations can be tough.

Larger agreements could result in greater benefits for companies, but they come with a trade-off:  bigger deals take longer to produce an impact.  The TPP negotiations have been under way for more than five years.  Even if we get a deal next week, the fastest timelines for implementation and entry into force is likely to be in mid-2017. 

One thing, however, is quite clear.  Absent business interest and mobilization, trade agreements are less likely to meet the needs of businesses today.  Officials will try to negotiate better deals, of course.  No one ever announced their intention to create “low quality, 19th century” outcomes. 

But getting better provisions requires sustained attention from businesses and governments.  The other megaregional agreement under negotiation in Asia, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), is going into the 10th round of talks in Busan, South Korea.  Officials have largely had limited contact with many of the companies in this region that are likely to have an interest in RCEP rules.

We are holding an event at RCEP on October 14 in Busan that seeks to bring together regional businesses and government officials engaged in this trade negotiation for the first time.  (To register to attend, please visit our website http://www.asiantradecentre.org/event-registration/ )  

Without better connections between government and businesses in the region, RCEP runs the risk of creating a trade agreement not particularly well suited to the demands and interests of the business community.  Given that trade agreements are primary intended to be a vehicle for facilitating trade by companies, a low-quality outcome in RCEP accompanied by little business interest would be an enormous missed opportunity. 

***Talking Trade is a blog post written by Dr. Deborah Elms, Executive Director, Asian Trade Centre, Singapore***