One way to interpret much of Sullivan’s speech is that it attempts to make lemonade out of lemons.  Given that the White House has had little cooperation with Congress, much of the economic agenda outlined by Sullivan will have to be enacted through Executive Orders.  Having foreign policy driven by this process severely limits the scope of the possible.  For example, while Sullivan rails in the speech about a focus on tariffs in the past, this is also an area of Congressional responsibility.  Unless and until Congress is prepared to address tariffs, the topic cannot be added to any negotiated trade agenda.  Declaring that tariffs are the root of all evil is a handy way of avoiding doing anything about them. Something similar is likely for a wide range of potential foreign economic topics which require or are enhanced by Congressional support.  Absent endorsement from Congress, it is necessary to come up with a complicated and complex agenda that allows the US to engage on economic issues with potential friends in Asia and elsewhere. Even within topics, the scope of commitments can be constrained by self-imposed negotiating limits on potential American actions.  This includes, as Talking Trade noted earlier, funding to support an IPEF or broader trade agenda, unless resources have been allocated elsewhere and can be readily redeployed.