In short, there are some sensible reasons for pushing the US to pick up and lead a new digital agreement. However, the Americans are not—to use a sporting metaphor—stepping onto a clean pitch. The game has already been underway for some time, particularly with important American trading partners and likely participants in any digital arrangements. The US will have to operate within an increasingly crowded landscape. More than 80 WTO members have been working on e-commerce through a Joint Statement Initiative (JSI) for some time. Other ongoing digital activities include the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and also, as noted, upgraded commitments in AANZFTA or Japan’s various trade deals, as well as ASEAN’s E-Commerce Agreement which is entering into force this year. There are also two types of digital-only trade deals already in place. The Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) is a stand-alone deal. It builds on the CPTPP commitments and included three original members of the agreement: Chile, New Zealand and Singapore. It is currently in force for the latter two countries and is likely to undergo expansion with the addition of new members shortly. There are also growing a number of Digital Economy Agreements (DEA) in place for Singapore. One is already in force with Australia with two more nearing the finish line: with South Korea and the UK. The DEAs are designed to build on existing bilateral free trade agreements. This means that they need not replicate all the features of a comprehensive agreement, including dispute settlement or the agreement management infrastructure, but compliment existing policies and procedures. If the US shows up and is prepared to work on a digital economy agreement, the first question will be what is to be included in such an arrangement that is not already covered under the JSI, CPTPP, RCEP, AANZFTA, DEPA, DEAs or other e-commerce and digital trade chapters in bilateral trade agreements?

Setting Trade Policies in the Biden Administration

Of course, confirmation is only needed at the top. Restaffing the rest of the vacant posts, however, will also take some time. This includes restarting the pipeline for junior talent in various agencies. At the same time that staff are being rapidly hired or rehired, it will be important to figure out what these people are meant to be doing. Getting alignment on policy is always challenging. The Biden team inherits a disrupted trade and economic policy landscape as well. As Biden’s team members have been saying recently, it will take time to sort out policy priorities and determine next steps. This is particularly true for China policy, where some of the existing policies, like tariffs, are likely to remain in place while others might be adjusted, removed, or even toughened. Incoming staff members will need to spend time taking stock of what policies are in place, which have been partially implemented, which are clearly not working well, what impact any or all of these policies have had, and what opportunities and challenges remain. Biden has already called for a “worker centered” trade and economic policy objective. It remains unclear exactly how this outcome might be best met. Existing policies will need to be recalibrated to better fit revised goals.